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COMMISSION and UTAH STATE 
INSURANCE FUND, 
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Attorney General of the 
State of Utah, 
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Commission 
State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOANN L. BAILEY, a widow, and 
TODD F. BAILEY, minor son of 
FRANK DEE BAILEY, deceased, 
vs. 
UTAH STATE INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION and UTAH STATE 
INSURANCE FUND, 
Defendants 
Case No. 
10148 
DEFENDANT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING 
AND 
SUPPORTING BRIEF 
Utah State Industrial Commission and Utah 
State Insurance Fund, the Defendants in the above 
entitled matter, by and through their attorney of 
record herein, pursuant to Rule 76(e), Utah Rules 
of CiYil Procedure, respectfully petition this Hon-
orable Court for a rehearing in the above entitled 
cause upon the following grounds: 
1. The decision negates the long established 
rule of this Court that one coming and going from 
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work is not covered by the Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act of the State of Utah. 
2. The decision constitutes "judicial legisla-
tion" and, in effect, extends the coverage afforded 
self-employed persons far beyond the coverage af-
forded to the employed workmen. 
3. The decision is erroneous in that it failed 
to sustain the finding of the Industrial Commission 
which was supported by competent testimony that 
the accident which resulted in the death of Frank 
Dee Bailey did not occur in the course of his em-
ployment. 
WHEREFORE, Defendants request that a 
rehearing be granted, that the Court re-examine 
the facts and the law and that the decision of the 
Industrial Commission of the State of Utah be 
affirmed. 
Dated this lOth day of March, A.D., 1965. 
CHARLES WELCH, JR. 
Attorney for Defendants, 
State Insurance Fund 
922 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL 
I hereby certify that I am the counsel for the 
Defendant, Utah State Insurance Fund, Petitioner 
herein, and that in my opinion there is good cause 
to believe the decision objected to is erroneous and 
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3 
that the case ought to be re-examined as prayed in 
the Petition, and that this Petition is not filed for 
the purpose of delay or to otherwise hinder the 
prosecution of this action. 
CHARLES WELCH, JR. 
Attorney for Defendant, 
State Insurance Fund 
922 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, U tab 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION 
FOR REHEARING 
POINT I. 
THE DECISION NEGATES THE LONG ES-
TABLISHED RULE OF THIS COURT THAT 
ONE COMING AND GOING FROM WORK IS 
NOT COVERED BY THE WORKMEN'S COM-
PENSATION ACT OF THE STATE OF UTAH. 
The opinion of the Court rendered in this case 
said: 
"This Court has ruled on numerous oc-
casions that accidents occurring to the em-
ployee while going to and from work, in the 
absence of a special mission, are not com-
pensable because they did not occur or arise 
out of the course of employment." 
In support of this statement the Court cited 
the following cases with which we agree, and which 
we feel clearly, are controlling in this case, and es-
tablish the rule that one going to or from work is 
not covered under the Workmen's Compensation 
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Act of the State of Utah: Covey-Ballard Motor Co. 
v. Industrial Commission, 64 U. I, 227 P. 1028; 
Wilson v. Industrial Commission, 116 U. 46, 207 P. 
2d. 1116; Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Industrial Com-
mission, 79 U. 189, 8 P. 2d. 617. 
The decision of this Court goes on to say that 
there are exceptions to the foregoing stated general 
rule and cites the case of Vitagraph Company v. 
Industrial Commission, 96 U. 190, 85 P. 2d. 601 in 
support of this proposition. However, we would like 
to point out that in the Vitagraph decision the Court 
stated the following: 
"It seems definitely settled that if a work-
man is injured in the normal course of things, 
in going to or from his work, or place of 
employment, that is the result of general 
hazards which all n1ust meet and assume and 
is not in the course of his employment." 
After citing cases the Court went on to say: 
"Such is what may be called the plant 
rule, where the employee does not attach 
himself to his employment until he arrives 
at the plant or locus of his work and he is 
not in the employment after he leaves the 
plant or situs of his work." 
We concede that the law of this state is 
that if an employee is injured while actually 
on a special mission for his employer, and which 
required him to deviate somewhat from the course 
of his travels while on his way to work that the 
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employee would be covered under the Workmen's 
Compensation Act of the State of Utah. We submit, 
however, that the burden of proof in this case 
rested with the Applicant to show that the deceased, 
after he left his home was actually engaged in or 
was on his way to engage in some work connected 
with the operation of the service station other than 
merely traveling to his place of work. The evidence 
presented to the Industrial Commission was clear 
that all Mr. Bailey was doing at the time the ac-
cident happened was traveling direct from his home 
to his place of employment. 
On direct examination Mrs. Bailey, the widow, 
was asked by her counsel, 
"Q. Now can you tell the Commission 
what Mr. Bailey's general habits were in 
opening the station in the mornings? 
A. Well, he opened. He always did the 
opening of the station. He left the house 
between 5 :00 and 5 :30 usually, and went 
directly to the station. 
Q. Calling your attention to the 23rd 
of September, 1963, do you know, Mrs. Bailey, 
what Mr. Bailey was doing at the time he 
was proceeding towards Lehi and met his 
death? 
A. He was going to open the station. 
Q. Now was he in his uniform, that he 
wore in the station, at the time of his death? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What type of uniform is that? 
A. It's a standard American Oil uni-
form. 
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Q. And it is a blue type uniform? 
A. The blue and white-stripe pants, with 
a white shirt, and their emblem on it. 
Q. He was wearing that at the time 
of the accident? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did he ever wear this uniform when 
he went out, when he was engaged in other 
activities? 
A. No. 
Q. Can you tell us approximately what 
time he left his home on the morning of the 
accident? 
A. I can't say definitely, but it would 
have been between 5:30 and 6 :00." (Rl5-
R-16). 
The above testimony is the entire testimony as 
to what Mr. Bailey was doing the morning of the 
accident. There was no room for speculation on the 
part of the Industrial Commission, nor would it have 
been proper for the Commission to have speculated 
or to have guessed that the deceased man was doing 
anything except traveling direct from his home to 
his place of business at the time the accident 
occurred. 
In the case of Wherritt v. Industrial Commis-
sion, 110 P. 2d. 37 4, 100 Utah 68, the question 
was whether Dr. Barton H. Wherritt was in the 
course of his employement and was covered under 
the Workmen's Compensation Act when his car 
went over the embankment in City Creek Canyon 
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at about 12 :00 midnight resulting in his death. 
The Court, in rendering its opinion, had the follow-
ing to say at 376 P. regarding the burden of proof: 
"The burden of proof is upon Applicant 
to establish her claim for compensation. 
Hi,qley v. Industrial Commission, 75 U. 861, 
285 P. 306; Bingham Mines Co. v. Allsop, 
59 U. 306, 203 P. 644. 
The fact finder is not always required 
to believe the uncontradicted evidence of a 
witness. Gagos v. Industrial Commission, 
87 U. 101, 48 P. 2d. 440, nor is it bound to 
adopt the theory of applicant for which there 
may be supporting evidence or inference. 
Sugar v. Industrial Commission, 94 U. 56, 75 
P. 2d. 311. 
The duties of this court are limited to a 
determination of questions of law. We may 
interfere with the commission's findings of 
fact * * * where an a ward is denied against 
uncontradicted evidence without any reason-
able basis for disbelieving the same. In such 
cases a question of law is presented for deter-
mination; otherwise, the findings of the com-
mission must be affirmed: Russell v. Indus-
trial Commission, 86 U. 306, 43 P. 2d. 1069, 
1072." 
The Court went on to say: 
"Our duty is to examine the record and, 
unless we can say that as a matter of law 
the conclusion of the Commission on the ques-
tion of "course of employment" was wrong 
because only the opposite conclusion could 
be drawn from these facts, to affirm." 
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In General Mills, Inc. et al. v. Industrial Cmn-
mission, 120 P. 2d. 279, 101 U. 214 the Court in 
citing another case stated that "mere surmise, con-
jecture, guess, or speculation" is insufficient. And 
the Court further said, "Further, the burden is on 
the complainant to prove that the injury is compens-
able." 120 P. 2d. at page 280. 
The testimony relating to the fact that the 
deceased was wearing an American Oil uniform at 
the time the acciden't occurred appears to us to be 
entirely immaterial. Most persons who are employed 
wear the clothes required by their employment dur-
ing the time that they travel to and from work. An 
office worker wears a business suit while he is 
traveling to and from his work and while he is 
working. Other persons wear various types of cloth-
ing. 
To further substantiate the fact that Mr. Bailey 
was doing nothing other than traveling to his place 
of employment is the fact that Mrs. Bailey indicated 
that he left home between 5:30 and 6:00 in the morn-
ing (R-16). The accident happened prior to a quarter 
to six as Fred Nakagawa, the operator of a garage 
who was called to the scene of the accident by the 
Highway Patrol Dispatcher, testified that he ar-
rived at the scene of the accident at approximately 
fifteen minutes to six on the morning of the ac-
cident. Therefore, there appears to be no possibility 
for speculation that Mr. Bailey was doing anything 
other than traveling directly from his home to his 
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placP of employment at the time the accident 
occurred. 
POINT II. 
THE DECISION CONSTITUTES "JUDI-
CIAL LEGISLATION" AND, IN EFFECT, EX-
TENDS THE COVERAGE AFFORDED SELF-
EMPLOYED PERSONS FAR BEYOND THE 
COVERAGE AFFORDED TO THE EMPLOYED 
vVORKMAN. 
We submit that the decision rendered by this 
Court should be again carefully reviewed because 
of what we believe will be a very great extension 
of the coverage afforded under the Workmen's Com-
pensation Act to those who are self-employed over 
and beyond the coverage afforded those who are 
not self-employed. We feel that the decision rendered 
herein as to self-employed persons, to all practical 
effects abrogates and sets aside the general rule 
that one coming to and going from his place of 
employment in the absence of a special mission is 
not covered by the Workmen's Compensation Act. 
The Court bases its decision upon the sole 
point that the station wagon involved in the accident 
was carried as a company asset and was used in 
connection with the service station business. In 
most businesses operated by a self-employed in-
dividual proprietor, an automobile is either wholly 
or partially charged to the operation of the business. 
This is true with lawyers, physicians, accountants, 
and persons operating service establishments of all 
kinds. 
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If the doctrine stated in the decision is car-
ried to its logical conclusion, then an individual 
proprietor who is injured while driving an automo-
bile which is either wholly or partially charged off 
as a business asset would be afforded coverage each 
day from the time he left his home until he arrived 
back home at night after completing the day's 
work. It often happens that doctors or lawyers are 
called out at night. To afford coverage because of 
the possibility that there might be a night call is 
an unwarranted extension of the coverage. Such a 
conclusion would afford the sole proprietor cover-
age far in excess of the coverage afforded to his 
employees under the decisions of this Court. 
This extension of coverage was certainly not 
in the contemplation of the Legislature when the 
act was amended in 1963 to permit sole proprietors 
to take advantage of the Workmen's Compensation 
Act. The intent of the Legislature was to give to sole 
proprietors, if they wished to pay the premium, the 
same benefits afforded their employees. 
The decision of the Court indicates that there 
was some weight placed on the fact that the deceased 
used the automobile for emergency calls at all 
hours. The decision also states that he carried some 
necessary tools and implements to service and repair 
customers' automobiles. The only tool mentioned was 
a starter cable which Mrs. Bailey testified she had 
seen her husband carry in the vehicle. This cable was 
not found at the scene of the accident although a 
search was made. (R-41, 42). The automobile was 
also used on occasion by customers when they left 
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their automobile to be serviced. Certainly the same 
conditions might be found to exist in connection with 
a doctor's automobile, and even, in some cases, a 
lawyer's automobile, both of whom, at times, are 
called out on emergencies and both of whom will at 
at times carry some of the necessary implements of 
their professions in their automobiles. But these 
facts alone should not insure a doctor or a lawyer 
under the Workmen's Compensation Act from the 
time he leaves his home unless he is then upon some 
special mission. And then under the previous deci-
sions of this Court the coverage is limited. See Fidel-
ity & Casualty Co. v. Industrial Commission, 8 P. 2d. 
617, 79 u. 189. 
The decision of the Court states that: 
"There are cases in authority to the ef-
fect that, when an employee is required by his 
employer to bring his own vehicle to the place 
of business for use, the employee is covered 
while going to and from work in the vehicle." 
There should be a distinction made between 
those cases in which an employer requires an em-
ployee to bring a vehicle to work and the instant 
case. In the former case the employee could have 
taken some other means of transportation to come 
to or go from his place of employment. However, 
in the instant case the deceased, of his own choos-
ing, drove the vehicle involved in the accident back 
and forth from his place of employment the same 
as a lawyer, doctor, adjuster or any other type of 
self -employed person would do. 
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An enlightening case which discusses a fact 
situation such as we have here in which the injured 
man was driving his own vehicle and carrying busi-
ness items is Philpott v. State Industrial Accident 
Commission, 234 Ore. 37, 379 P. 2d. 1010 (1963). 
The court in that case quoted the following from 
Larsen, Workmen's Compensation Law, Vol. I, Sec. 
18.24, page 251, as follows ( 1014 P. 2d.) : 
"The mere fact that claimant is, while 
going to work, also carrying with him some 
of the paraphernalia of his employment does 
not, in itself, convert the trip into a part of 
the employment." 
In the Philpott case the owner of a truck agreed 
to haul logs to a lumber mill at the rate of $6.00 
per thousand board feet. The owner paid all expense 
incurred in the operation of the truck. He kept the 
truck at his home, and used it to drive to the job 
site. As he was about to leave for work one morning 
he discovered that he had forgotten his lunch. He 
was injured as he jumped from the truck. 
It was argued that it benefited the em pi oyer 
for the plaintiff to drive his truck to and from 
work, as it saved time. It was argued also that as 
the truck was a necessary piece of equipment in 
the work of hauling logs, and that the plaintiff 
should be regarded as "rendering a service" to his 
employer by "carrying employment impedimenta to 
and from work." (279 2d. 1013). 
The Orgeon court then quoted the statement 
from Larsen's Compensation Law, Section 18.24 as 
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above set forth; and held against the plaintiff. The 
Court said: 
"To allow the present claim would be to 
sanction an unjustifiable departure from 
controlling precedents." 
Because of the very broad and serious extension 
of the coverage under the Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act to a very limited number of persons by 
the decision rendered in this case it is important 
and desirable that the Court again review the case 
and its decision in the light of its past decisions and 
the apparent legislative intent. 
POINT III. 
THE DECISION IS ERRONEOUS IN THAT 
IT FAILED TO SUSTAIN THE FINDING OF 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION WHICH WAS 
SUPPORTED BY COMPETENT TESTIMONY 
THAT THE ACCIDENT WHICH RESULTED 
IN THE DEATH OF FRANK DEE BAILEY DID 
NOT OCCUR IN THE COURSE OF HIS EM-
PLOYMENT. 
It has been established by numerous decisions 
of this Court that it is the exclusive prerogative of 
the Industrial Commission to appraise the evidence 
and make findings of fact, which findings must not 
not be disturbed if there is reasonable evidence to 
support them. 
This finding of the Commission in part reads : 
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No evidence was presented by Applicant 
to prove that deceased was in the course of 
his employment as a self-insured owner and 
operator of the business. In fact, the evidence 
is undisputed and conclusive, in our opinion, 
that the deceased was going to work when 
he was fatally injured and not on a special 
mission. 
This finding was based upon the clear and 
conclusive evidence presented in this case and the 
decision of the Industrial Commission should be af-
firmed by this Court. See Kent v. Industrial Com-
mission, 89 U. 331, 57 P. 2d. 724. 
The only states which have optional coverage 
for partners and individual proprietorships are the 
states of Colorado, North Dakota, Oregon and 
Utah. As far as we have been able to learn there 
have been no decisions rendered in any of the states 
on the point involved in this case. We, therefore, 
believe that our state should not extend the coverage 
under the Workmen's Compensation Act beyond that 
which has been previously accepted and defined by 
this Court. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that on the law 
and the facts, the decision of the Industrial Com-
mission should be affirmed. 
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Respectfully submitted, 
CHARLES WELCH, JR. 
Attorney for Defendant, 
Utah State Insurance Fund, 
922 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Mailed a copy of the foregoing Defendant's 
Petition for Rehearing and Supporting Brief to 
Heber Grant Ivins, Attorney for Applicant, 75 
North Center Street, American Fork, Utah, and 
to Phil L. Hansen, Attorney General, Attorney for 
Defendant, Utah State Industrial Commission, At-
torney General's Office, State Capitol Building, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, this ________ day of March, A.D., 
1965. 
Charles Welch, Jr. 
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